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Abstract 
I distinguish between two broadly different interpretations of anomalous monism. I 
then pose problems for both. I argue that one interpretation leads to well known 
problems concerning epiphenomenalism, whilst the other interpretation is 
implausible because it fails to give a good account of the role of properties in 
causation. I then develop a new version of anomalous monism, which can avoid both 
of these issues. This view draws heavily on the metaphysics of dispositions, as well 
as work on causation. I conclude that anomalous monism is deserving of a 
reappraisal. 
 
Keywords: Anomalous monism, Properties, Epiphenomenalism, Laws. 
1. What is Anomalous monism? 
Anomalous monism was famously put forward by Donald Davidson (1970a). Three 
claims lie at its core (Davidson 1970a: 105-106):  
i) The Principle of Causal Interaction: at least some mental events interact 
causally with physical events.  
ii) The Nomological Character of Causality: where there is causality, there 
must be a law. That is to say, events related as cause and effect fall under 
strict deterministic laws. 
iii) The Anomalism of the Mental: there are no strict deterministic laws on 
the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained. 
I will not primarily be concerned with providing motivation for these claims. This 
is not to say that the motivations for them are unimportant or that the claims are 
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uncontentious. For example, Davidson describes claim (iii) as ‘true and worth 
arguing for’ (1993: 3), though many have thought that it is neither true, nor worth 
arguing for (Crane and Mellor 1990: 196). (i) and (ii) are also controversial: most 
would accept (i), though its acceptance is by no means universal (Jackson 1982) and 
some do not believe in laws at all, and so would presumably reject (ii) (Mumford 
2004: ch.9, van Frassen 1989). So, it is an important and substantial question whether 
we should accept (i-iii). Nonetheless, it is not a question that will be considered in 
this paper. Rather, I am primarily interested in whether there is a view of the mind 
that can reconcile these claims, rather than with providing the background reasons 
one might have to accept them.1 
Though the motivations for these claims will not be directly addressed, it is 
worth noting that this paper is still of interest to those unconvinced by (i-iii). This is 
because once these claims are correctly fleshed out, they turn out to be more anodyne 
than perhaps they initially appear. This, in turn, may alleviate resistance to them.  
It is also worth emphasising that anomalous monists may accept weakened 
versions of these claims. For example, few contemporary thinkers would accept that 
causes and effects must fall under deterministic laws, as (ii) asserts. However, a view 
that denies that laws are deterministic, but otherwise accepts (ii) and a suitably 
modified version of (iii), would clearly still deserve the name ‘anomalous monism’. 
This paper is not concerned with discussing these minor modifications of claims (i-
iii), so I will leave them as they are in what follows. 
																																																								
1 My approach is similar in this way to Davidson’s own, though he does give some reasons to 
accept (iii), which is the most contentious of the claims (1970a: 118-119). 
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Davidson’s view has been interpreted in various importantly different ways. In 
section 2, I divide these interpretations into two broad kinds, which I call the 
‘property dualist’ and the ‘nominalist’ interpretations. I outline one objection to each 
interpretation, and argue that a third version of anomalous monism is required. I 
develop one in sections 3-5, arguing that this version can avoid both of the problems 
associated with the other two interpretations. I conclude that this is the best version 
of anomalous monism. In section 6, I discuss the relation of this view to mind-brain 
identity theory and in section 7, I discuss what impact the view has on the ontology 
of events. 
In this paper, I will take anomalous monism to be any view of the mind that 
embraces (i-iii), or perhaps some minor modifications of these claims. So, as I use the 
term, we need not accept all of the claims that Davidson himself accepted in order to 
be anomalous monists: to be an anomalous monist we just need to preserve the three 
core claims. Relatedly, I should be clear that I certainly do not claim that the version 
of anomalous monism that I develop is what Davidson actually had in mind. On the 
contrary, for reasons that will become clear, I think this is not the case. So, I do not 
claim that Davidson would be happy with the view, just that it is the most plausible 
view of the mind that reconciles (i-iii). 
It may be asked why readers should care about anomalous monism. After all, 
the view has largely fallen out of favour in the contemporary debate, and is rarely 
discussed in the metaphysics of mind these days. In response to this, I say that we 
should examine the strongest version of a position before we dismiss it. It is my 
contention that the strongest version of anomalous monism has yet to be supplied. 
The view argued for in this paper can avoid the objections that have been thought by 
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many to be fatal for anomalous monism. Therefore, if what I say in this paper is 
correct, then the current unpopularity of anomalous monism is unjustified, and the 
view is deserving of a reappraisal. 
2. Two interpretations, two objections. 
I divide interpretations of anomalous monism into two broad classes. These classes 
are distinguished by how they interpret the word ‘property’. Sometimes, ‘property’ 
is used in a realist sense, to refer to a real constituent of the world, which exists 
independently of the way we describe it. For example, plausibly the charge of a 
particular electron is a feature of the electron, which would exist even if humans did 
not exist, and could not describe it, and is distinct from all of its other properties such 
as its mass. On this meaning, to say that an object has a property is metaphysically 
heavyweight: it means that it has some objective, real feature. 
Conversely, sometimes ‘property’ is used in a less heavyweight sense, where 
properties are more closely allied with concepts, or predicates, or descriptions. On 
this use, to say that an object has a certain property just means that a certain 
predicate (description/concept) applies truly to it, but this does not imply that there 
must be one single unique property (in the heavyweight sense) that the object has in 
virtue of which that predicate applies to it. 2 
For example, it is certainly true to say of me that I am ‘not the Eiffel Tower’. In 
the lightweight sense, then, I have the property of being not the Eiffel Tower 
(because it is true to say of me that I am not the Eiffel Tower). In the more 
heavyweight sense, though, I do not have a single property of being not the Eiffel 																																																								
2 This distinction in the way that ‘property’ is used will be familiar to metaphysicians, e.g. 
Mellor (1991) and Heil (2003: 22-30). 
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Tower. Rather, I have properties such as mass, height and so on. In addition to all of 
these properties, I do not have the additional property of being not the Eiffel Tower. If 
we were to list all of the real elements of our ontology, my property of being not the 
Eiffel Tower would not appear there. 
For clarity, in this paper, when I say ‘property’ I mean the heavyweight sense. 
For the second sense, I will simply talk of predicates or descriptions, which truly apply 
to certain entities. With this distinction in place, we can examine the different 
interpretations of anomalous monism. 
 
 
2.1 Property Dualism 
The first interpretation of anomalous monism is familiar from the work of Jaegwon 
Kim (1985, 1993) and Brian McLaughlin (1993), amongst others. On this 
interpretation, Davidson claims that mental events have two distinct kinds of 
properties: mental and physical ones. This interpretation of anomalous monism thus 
takes Davidson to be a property realist, and for the mental and the physical to be 
distinct properties of the same events. On this view, mental and physical 
descriptions both pick out the same events, albeit in virtue of distinct properties of 
those events. 
The implausibility of this version of anomalous monism is well known. 
Opponents of this view argue that integrating this view with the three claims at the 
core of anomalous monism causes problems. Specifically, they claim that because of 
the anomalousness of the mental, claim (iii), mental properties cannot feature in any 
strict laws. Since mental properties do not feature in any strict laws, then they cannot 
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contribute to any of the causal powers that the event has (claim (ii)).3 In short, mental 
properties do not feature in laws, and without laws, there is no causation. Opponents 
who push this line accept that mental events have causal powers, but they insist that 
mental events cannot have causal powers in virtue of their mental properties. Such 
thinkers thus accuse anomalous monism of implying that mental properties are 
epiphenomenal (Kim 1993). 4  
 
2.2 Nominalism 
The second interpretation of anomalous monism differs crucially in that it does not 
ascribe to Davidson a realist view of properties, but instead takes seriously 
Davidson’s nominalism (Heil 2008, Gibb 2012). Proponents of this interpretation 
sometimes point out that Davidson admits events into his ontology, because we must 
quantify over them (1969, 1970b).5 However (on this interpretation) he does not 
admit properties in the ontologically heavyweight sense. Proponents of this 
interpretation urge that rather than thinking of events as having mental and physical 
properties, we should rather think of events as being amenable to mental and physical 
descriptions. 
If this interpretation is correct, then the accusation of epiphenomenalism fizzles 
out: on this view, it does not make sense to say that mental events only cause things 
in virtue of their physical (rather than their mental) properties. Rather, events simply 
																																																								
3 Because (by (ii)), if they did contribute to the event’s causal powers on the physical, then 
there must be laws linking the mental to the physical (i.e. psychophysical laws) and (iii) 
would be violated. 
4  Kim and McLaughlin provide the canonical accusation of epiphenomenalism against 
anomalous monism. See Campbell (2005) for a different approach to the issue of 
epiphenomenalism and anomalous monism. 
5 Here Davidson is taking his inspiration from Quine’s (1948) criterion for ontological 
commitment: we are committed to that which we quantify over. 
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cause things, and because (as a nominalist) Davidson does not admit properties into 
his ontology, it makes no sense to ask which properties the event caused something 
in virtue of. Certainly (on this interpretation of anomalous monism) it is true that 
certain events can be described using mental and physical predicates. Indeed, these 
different mental and physical descriptions may figure in different causal explanations, 
which are importantly different in various ways. However, these descriptions cast no 
ontological shadow: they do not come with ontologically heavyweight commitment 
to mental and physical properties, at least not according to this interpretation of 
Davidson (Heil 2008 and Gibb 2012). 
This version of anomalous monism has the advantage of dodging the accusation 
of the epiphenomenalism of the mental, but the nominalistic metaphysics that it 
relies upon carries unwelcome consequences. Specifically, by doing away with 
properties of events, and only admitting descriptions of events, it becomes impossible 
to say that events cause things in virtue of certain of their specific properties. This 
result is implausible. Consider someone throwing a brick at a window, and the 
window’s smashing. Here we have two events (the throwing and the smashing) 
linked as cause and effect. And yet it seems clear that there are certain properties of 
the former event (such as the force of the throwing) that are causally relevant to the 
smashing; and other properties (such as the time of day of the throwing) that are not 
relevant to the smashing. Davidson’s ontology has the implausible consequence that 
it is not literally true that certain properties of the throwing are causally relevant, 
whilst others are not (because he is a nominalist about properties). Rather, Davidson 
must claim that the throwing simply causes the smashing, and that any talk of the 
properties of each event must be construed in a metaphysically anodyne way simply 
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as descriptions of the events, and as causal explanations of them. The implausibility of 
this result is the primary problem for the second interpretation of Davidson.6 
3. A powerful anomalous monism 
There are two things to notice about these two objections to anomalous monism: 
First, note that the problem for the nominalistic interpretation of Davidson arises 
because of the very thing that solved the problem with the property dualist 
interpretation. That is to say, banning properties from our ontology and accepting 
nominalism is what solved the problem of the epiphenomenalism of the mental, but 
banning properties is precisely what generates implausible consequences for the 
nominalistic view. Second, note that the two objections are very different in spirit. 
The objection to the property dualist interpretation applies pressure internal to the 
philosophy of mind: it threatens to make the mental epiphenomenal. Conversely, the 
objection to the nominalistic interpretation applies pressure from outside of 
philosophy of mind: from the background metaphysics because it results in an 
implausible view of causal interaction generally. A solution will have to alleviate 
both the internal and external pressure.  
Start with the external pressure that besets the nominalist version of anomalous 
monism. We will not be able to release this pressure unless we admit properties into 																																																								
6 Notice that in this example, I am distinguishing between the causally efficacious and 
causally inefficacious properties of the event. Of course, there is also a need to distinguish 
between the efficacious and the inefficacious properties of the objects that participate in the 
event. For example, certain properties of the brick (such as its mass and solidity) will be 
causally relevant to the smashing, and other properties of the brick (such as its colour) will 
not be. Likewise for the window. Of course, Davidson’s inability to distinguish between 
causally efficacious and causally inefficacious properties arises with both events and objects 
case, since (on this nominalistic interpretation) Davidson would admit neither properties of 
objects or of events into his ontology. It is an important question whether the properties of 
events can be reduced or explained away in terms of the properties of objects that participate 
in those events, but I will not discuss that issue here. 
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our ontology, because without properties, we certainly cannot claim that an event 
caused another in virtue of certain of its properties but not others. This will mean a 
revision to Davidson’s nominalist metaphysics. However, as we have seen, the 
nominalist metaphysics is independently implausible when it comes to matters of 
causation, so a revision is no loss. 
By admitting properties, we can say that the throwing of the brick caused the 
smashing in virtue of certain of its properties, but not in virtue of others. Thus, the 
external, ontological pressure on anomalous monism from the metaphysics of 
causation is alleviated. However, if we do admit properties into our ontology, then 
how can we avoid the problems associated with the property dualist interpretation 
of anomalous monism? And how can we make sense of the three claims at the heart 
of anomalous monism?  
The difficulty for the property dualist interpretation of anomalous monism 
stems from the claim that mental and physical properties are distinct properties of 
events. Only once we claim that mental and physical properties are distinct 
properties of events can we ask which ones caused a certain effect, and only then can 
questions of causal competition between physical and mental properties arise. 
However, we can reject this assumption. Rather, we can claim that events have 
certain properties, but claim that the mental properties of events are identical with 
certain of their physical properties. Once we have this identity, we cannot ask 
whether the mental event has causal powers in virtue of its mental or physical 
properties because the mental properties are physical.  
On the view I recommend, physical and mental descriptions both pick out the 
same event, and each one can do so in virtue of a property of the event, but the 
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property of the event that is picked out by the physical description is identical with 
the property of the event picked out by the mental description. In this way, the 
properties that answer to mental descriptions and the properties that answer to 
physical ones are the very same properties: they are identical. Thus, since the property 
picked out by the mental description is no different from the property picked out by 
the other, there is no competition between the two properties, and the threat of 
epiphenomenalism is avoided. 
For example, we may pick out a certain event using a mental description, such 
as ‘the experience of pain’. This description picks out a certain event in virtue of one 
of its properties (its painfulness). Another, physical description of an event, such as 
‘nociceptors firing’ could serve to pick out the same event, also in virtue of one of its 
properties (its property of firing, say). However, if we are to avoid the threat of 
epiphenomenalism, we must reject the claim that these descriptions latch on to 
distinct physical and mental properties. Rather, the two properties are to be identified, 
and questions of causal competition never arise.7 
This view takes elements from both interpretations of anomalous monism we 
discussed in §2. From the first, it takes properties ontologically seriously, and from 
the second, it takes the idea that the difference between the mental and the physical 
should be seen as a difference in the predicates or descriptions applied to certain 
events, rather than ontologically robust differences in the events or properties 
themselves. 
																																																								
7 Keen readers will notice a similarity here between the view I proposed and certain versions 
of mind-brain identity theory (Smart 1959), especially the so called ‘phenomenal concept 




So far, I hope to have shown how we can avoid the two pressures applied to the 
different interpretations of anomalous monism. However, currently I have not said 
how this view can account for the three claims at the heart of anomalous monism. 
Without doing this, the view is no version of anomalous monism at all. It is to this 
issue that I now turn. 
4.  Laws, dispositions and nomological connections. 
The important question at this point, of course, is what sense can be made of the 
causal efficacy of the mental (i) in the light of the claim that causation requires a strict 
law (ii) and that there are no strict laws on the basis of which mental events can be 
predicted and explained (iii)? In what follows, I will explain how we can 
accommodate all of these claims within the framework sketched above. In doing this, 
the view I propose will become clearer. 
4.1 Predicates, dispositions and causation. 
To answer these questions, we will need some more claims about mental and 
physical predicates on the table, as well as some claims about causation.8 Some 
descriptions pick out their referents in terms of their dispositional characteristics. For 
example, the predicate ‘is fragile’ picks out its referent in virtue of its dispositional 
profile: to be fragile is to be disposed to smash if a certain force is applied to it (certis 
paribus). We can call descriptions that make use of these predicates dispositional 
descriptions.  
Now, plausibly, at least some physical predicates are dispositional predicates. 
That is to say, when we pick out entities using physical predicates, we are picking 
them out in terms of their dispositional profile (at least sometimes). As Chalmers 																																																								
8 I develop this view of mental and physical predicates further in Taylor (2017).  
Henry	Taylor	
	 12	
says ‘a property such as mass is characterised by its associated dispositional role, 
such as the tendency to resist acceleration’ (2010: 133).9  
Notice the modesty of my claim: it is not that all physical predicates are 
dispositional, and it is not that all dispositional properties can be described by 
physics.10 It is just that at least some physical predicates are dispositional in this way. 
Now, contrast those with mental predicates. Plausibly, mental predicates are not 
dispositional in this way: to characterise something as a particular conscious 
experience, or (to borrow a list from Davidson himself (1970a:105)) a perceiving, 
remembering, decision or action is not to describe it in terms of what it would do in 
certain circumstances. Rather, these predicates do not pick out their referents in 
terms of their dispositional profiles, but describe them entirely in terms of their 
‘occurrent’ nature: how they are now, rather than how they would behave in certain 
circumstances. 
So far, we have the claims that at least some physical predicates are 
dispositional, and that mental predicates are not like this. Now, to see the connection 
to causation (and to claims (i-iii)), we will need to explain what I call dispositional 
connections. 
What is a ‘dispositional connection’? Well, consider that dispositional properties 
are linked to other dispositional properties in certain reliable ways. For example, the 
property of solubility possessed by common salt is reliably linked to properties 
possessed by water such as dipolarity, and electrostatic attraction, with the result 
that if the properties of the salt come in contact with the properties of the water, then 
																																																								
9 See also Blackburn (1990) and Hawthorne (2001: 368). 
10 In Taylor (2016) I demonstrate the dangers of sliding between these different claims. 
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an event of dissolving will occur (certis paribus). In the contemporary jargon, the 
property of solubility is linked to certain stimuli properties, which are the properties 
that would trigger them to bring about their manifestation (in this case the properties 
of the water like dipolarity) and manifestation properties, which are the properties 
involved in the events that they would bring about if they come into contact with 
their stimuli (in this case, the properties involved in the event of dissolving). Indeed, 
these links to stimuli and manifestation properties are possessed by all dispositional 
properties. It is these links to stimuli and manifestations that I refer to as 
‘dispositional connections’.11 
A further claim is that the nomological links between different properties can be 
identified with their dispositional connections. That is to say, properties are 
connected to one another in certain lawlike ways. For example, the statement ‘f=ma’ 
expresses a nomological relation between the properties of force, mass and 
acceleration. Anything that has the property of mass will thus hold a relation to 
acceleration and force, in virtue of having the particular property of mass. The claim 
I want to urge is that these nomological relations, which bind together properties in a 
lawlike and reliable web, are to be identified with the dispositional connections of 
stimulus and manifestation. 12  Nomological connections are dispositional 
connections.13 
																																																								
11  Some (Martin 2008) prefer to say ‘reciprocal dispositional partners for mutual 
manifestation’ rather than ‘stimuli’, but nothing I have to say will turn on this issue. 
12 Of course, this assumes a particular view about what nomological connections are, which I 
do not have space to argue for. For more on this kind of view, see Bird (2007) and also 
Armstrong (1983). 
13 Notice that this view is neutral on the question of whether these nomological connections 
are necessary (Bird 2007) or contingent (Armstrong 1983, 1997). 
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A final note on objects and events: above I have said that properties have 
nomological connections to one another, and I urged that these are to be identified 
with dispositional connections. We can now also incorporate the idea that objects 
and events also have nomological relations to each other, in virtue of having such 
properties. For example, the salt is an object, which has the property of solubility. 
This property has a dispositional/nomological link to the properties of water. 
Because of these properties, the salt and the water themselves have such 
dispositional/nomological relations too: the salt is linked to the water, in virtue of the 
fact that the salt and the water have properties that have these strong nomological 
links. Mutatis mutandis for events. In what follows, I will tend to talk about 
nomological connections between properties, but it is important to bear in mind that 
this can be extended to events and objects that instantiate those properties. 
 
4.2 ‘Law’? 
One final terminological point must be made before we can see how all of this helps 
the anomalous monist. This concerns the term ‘law’ in the three statements at the 
core of anomalous monism. The term ‘law’ is used in at least two different ways, 
which mirror the heavyweight and lightweight uses of the term ‘property’ I 
highlighted above. Sometimes, the term is used to refer to the actual links between 
different properties in the world: the nomological connections themselves (we find 
this in Bird 2007). At other times, the term is used to refer simply to a statement or 
description of a particular nomological connection. On the latter understanding, a 
statement such as ‘f=ma’ would be a law, whilst in the former, the law itself would be 
the actual connection itself between the properties of force, mass and acceleration. 
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Davidson tends to use the term ‘law’ in the lightweight sense, as an expression or 
statement of a nomological connection, whereas he tends to use the term ‘causality’ to 
express the actual nomological connections themselves. He says: 
‘events instantiate a law only as described in one way rather than another, 
but we cannot say that an event caused another only as described’ (1993: 6).14 
And: 
‘Causality and identity are relations between individual events no matter 
how described. But laws are linguistic; and so events can instantiate laws… 
only as those events are described in one way or another’ (1970a: 111). 
Here, an event’s instantiating a law is taken to be dependent on how it is 
described, and it is said that laws are ‘linguistic’. This makes no sense if we read him 
as using the term ‘law’ as expressing an objective connection between events, which 
would exist no matter how the events are described. However, if we take the term 
‘law’ to mean a statement or expression that refers to a particular nomological 
connection between events, then we can make sense of the idea that an event could 
be subject to a law only given a certain description (and this clearly fits with his 
claim that laws are ‘linguistic’). With this in mind, I follow Davidson and use ‘law’ to 
in the lightweight sense, as an expression or statement of a nomological connection, 
and the term ‘nomological connection’ to refer to the actual objective connections in 
nature between dispositional properties, which explains why they act in law-like 
manners.  
																																																								




5.  Back to the three claims 
I have outlined six claims: 
1) At least some physical predicates are dispositional predicates. 
2) Mental predicates are not dispositional predicates. 
3) Dispositional properties are linked with each other through stimulus and 
manifestation relations. 
4)  The nomological connections that properties have to each other just are these 
dispositional connections. 
5) Events and objects can also have nomological connections to one another, in 
virtue of having properties that have these nomological connections.  
6) Laws are expressions or statements that express nomological connections 
between properties. 
We are now in a position to see how the view incorporates anomalous monism’s 
three core claims. The basic ideas are as follows: there are events, which have 
properties. These events can be referred to in virtue of their properties, and these 
properties themselves can be picked out under at least two importantly different 
kinds of description. On the one hand, we can pick out these properties using 
physical descriptions. At least some of these physical descriptions characterise these 
properties in terms of their dispositional connections to other properties. These 
dispositional connections are themselves nomological connections between 
properties. Because of this, to characterise a property dispositionally is to 
characterise it in terms of its nomological connections to other properties. Because 
such descriptions express the nomological connections between properties, it is these 
descriptions that are apt to be laws (it is crucial to recall that by ‘laws’, I mean 
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descriptions of nomological connections, not the nomological connections 
themselves). This is why physical descriptions are those in virtue of which events fall 
under laws.  
On the other hand, we can also pick out a property non-dispositionally. This is 
the case with mental descriptions: they do not characterise phenomena 
dispositionally. Because mental descriptions are non-dispositional, they do not 
express the nomological connections between properties. Because a law is just a 
statement of such a nomological connection, it follows that statements containing 
mental descriptions are not apt to be laws. As a result, there are no laws that feature 
mental descriptions. This is the sense in which there are no psychophysical laws: 
there are no laws featuring mental and physical terms, because mental terms cannot 
figure in laws. This is the anomalism of the mental. This is (iii). 15 
At this point, making sense of (i) and (ii) becomes easy. Consider (i): the claim 
that at least some mental events interact causally with physical events. This simply 
states that there are nomological connections between at least some mental and at 
least some physical events. Suppose we have some mental event, e, which has a 
nomological connection with some physical event, p. This nomological connection 
holds regardless of how e and p are described (this follows closely what Davidson 
means by ‘causality’ in the quotations given above). In virtue of having this 
nomological connection with p, e is a mental event that interacts causally with a 
physical event, so (i) is satisfied.  
																																																								
15 For this explanation to work, we need to accept that properties can be picked out using 
dispositional and non-dispositional descriptions. For more on this idea (and for more 




Now, by (ii), it follows from the fact that e and p have this nomological 
connection that e and p must fall under a law. That means that they must be 
describable in a way that expresses the nomological connection between them. In my 
view, this is because e and p are amenable to dispositional description using physical 
predicates. In virtue of being describable in this way, e and p fall under a law, and 
thus (ii) is satisfied.  
The fact that p and e could be described in this dispositional way (and thus fall 
under a law) does not stop it being true that these events could also be described using 
non-dispositional, mental descriptions. In fact, it is true that e is describable using a 
mental description, but (crucially) these mental descriptions do not feature in laws. Only 
the physical descriptions can feature in laws. To repeat a point already made, this is 
because mental descriptions are non-dispositional descriptions, and thus do not 
express the dispositional/nomological connections between properties, and on the 
view I urge, a law just is an expression of such a nomological connection. Because 
these mental descriptions do not feature in laws, there are no laws describing the 
nomological link between p and e that feature mental descriptions (even though there 
are laws featuring dispositional descriptions, which express the nomological link 
between p and e). In this sense, there are no psychophysical laws linking p and e. 
Thus, we satisfy the anomalousness of the mental (claim iii). So, we have satisfied all 
three of (i), (ii) and (iii). We have full-blooded anomalous monism. 
I have outlined a view on which anomalous monism does not collapse into 
property dualism. Thus, the view avoids the charge of epiphenomenalism. On the 
view I recommend, anomalous monism also accepts realism about properties, and so 
avoids the problems associated with nominalistic interpretations of anomalous 
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monism. The view also makes sense of claims (i-iii), and is therefore clearly a version 
of anomalous monism. Since the view avoids all of the problems associated with 
other versions, I conclude that it is the best version of anomalous monism available. 
6.  Identity theory 
In these final sections, I will discuss two worries that may be levelled at the view that 
I have developed. The first question is how my view stands to traditional identity 
theory. 16 Specifically, I have argued that mental and physical descriptions can both 
co-refer to the same events, and that they both latch on to the same properties of those 
events as well. This sounds a lot like the identity theory of J. J. C. Smart (1959), as 
well as the more modern incarnations of identity theory such as the ‘phenomenal 
concept strategy’ (Papineau 2002). To Smart and Papineau, mental events and 
properties are identical with physical events and properties. Each of them accepts 
that mental and physical concepts are distinct, and that these concepts behave quite 
differently from each other. However, Smart and Papineau insist that they pick out 
the same entities (Smart 1959: 144). It may be wondered how my version of 
anomalous monism is any different from this kind of identity theory.  
I am sanguine about the overlap here. Insofar as the proposed version of 
anomalous monism accepts that mental events and properties are identical with 
physical events and properties, it clearly is a kind of identity theory. I am perfectly 
happy to accept this result. My concern in this paper is to develop a version of 
anomalous monism that is superior to the versions that have gone before. As I have 
said, I take any view that accepts claims (i-iii) to be a version of anomalous monism. 
																																																								
16 Thanks to Laura Gow for pressing me on this. 
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If this view happens to also be a version of identity theory, then so be it. The view 
can still claim all of the attractiveness of any anomalous monist view, whether it is 
also a version of identity theory or not. 
More generally, finding that anomalous monism is a version of identity theory 
should in no way surprise us. Davidson himself says that ‘mental events are identical 
with physical events’ (1970a: 107). The view developed here just takes two extra 
steps: it accepts the existence of mental properties and then identifies them with 
physical properties. 
Of course, the worry here might be rephrased. It might be said that the worry is 
not just that the view is a version of mind-brain identity, but rather that the version 
of anomalous monism developed here does not confer any additional theoretical 
advantage over the more traditional formulations of identity theory. If we just end 
up with a version of identity theory, why not just embrace the Smart/Papineau 
version of identity theory in the first place? The response to this criticism is clear: 
what my view adds to the traditional mind-brain identity theory is the machinery 
concerning mental and physical descriptions, dispositional and non-dispositional 
descriptions, laws of nature and nomological connections. Why is this extra 
machinery important? Because it is this machinery that is needed to explain how (i-
iii) all fit together, and thus to make the view a version of anomalous monism in the 
first place. So, insofar as anomalous monism is attractive at all then this added 
machinery is attractive. Since the Smart/Papineau version of identity theory does not 
have this machinery, it cannot claim to be a version of anomalous monism, and so 
cannot claim the attractiveness of anomalous monism. 
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Here it is worth re-emphasising that in this paper I have not explicitly examined 
why one should accept claims (i-iii). Rather, I have assumed that it is at least 
important to see whether a view can be developed which reconciles them in a 
plausible way. That is the project of this paper, and that is what justifies the 
additional machinery in addition to the Smart/Papineau view. Of course, for readers 
who are unattracted to anomalous monism entirely, this will not be compelling. 
However, since it is not the purpose of this paper to motivate anomalous monism, 
but rather to provide the best version of the view, this is not the place to attempt to 
convince those who are already entirely unmoved by the anomalous monist 
picture.17 
7. Events  
In this paper, I have been discussing events, and I have been talking about properties 
of events. Those familiar with Davidson’s work may wonder how much damage this 
does to his view of events. Davidson (1969, 1970b) takes events to be basic 
particulars, and he says this about how events are individuated: 
‘events are identical if and only if they have exactly the same causes and 
effects’ (1969: 179). 
																																																								
17 My opponent might try a third time, and say that the problem is not so much that my view 
is a version of identity theory, and not so much that it confers no advantage over identity 
theory, but that it falls prey to all of the objections that identity theory suffers from, such as 
the famous ‘knowledge’ and ‘zombie’ arguments (Jackson 1982, Chalmers 2010). In response 
to this, I say that the additional machinery added here can help the identity theorist deal with 
these arguments. I do not have space to explain how, but elsewhere I have argued that if we 
accept that mental properties can be referred to using dispositional and non-dispositional 
concepts, then the knowledge and zombie arguments can be satisfactorily answered (Taylor 




A worry might be raised here for my proposal. Davidson’s account of events 
makes no mention of properties. This is especially clear on nominalistic 
interpretations of Davidson, on which it is not just that properties don’t feature in 
Davidson’s ontology of events, they don’t appear anywhere in his ontology at all! 
My own view clearly and openly makes use of properties, and says that events have 
properties. Does this mean that my proposed view is incompatible with Davidson’s 
view of events? If so, is that a problem? 
Here we could go two ways: the first would be to abandon Davidson’s view of 
events entirely, and embrace an alternate one: one that takes properties ontologically 
seriously. The obvious choice would be Kim’s (1973, 1976) view, on which events are 
‘property exemplifications’. That is to say, a particular event is a substance’s having a 
property at a time, and events are individuated by all three of these elements: the 
substance, the property and the time at which they occur. Such a view has a clear 
and obvious place for properties, and as such would be amenable to the anomalous 
monist position I have put forward.18 Of course, the Kimian view is the most widely 
accepted view that places properties centre stage, but any view of events that takes 
properties seriously (e.g. Bennett 1988, Lombard 1986) would do just as well. 
																																																								
18 Notice that, on Kim’s account, the sense in which events have properties is quite different 
from the sense in which substances have properties. A ball can instantiate the property of 
redness at time t, say. But the event of the ball’s being red at t does not instantiate the property 
of redness (the event is not red). Rather, the event is essentially constituted by the property of 
redness, along with the ball and the time. So (on Kim’s account) the sense in which the event 
has a property is the sense of essential constitution, not the sense of instantiation. It is an 
interesting question whether (on Kim’s view) it is possible for an event to instantiate a 
property in the same way that a ball could instantiate a property such as redness, but I will 
not discuss that matter here. Personally, I am very attracted to Kim’s account, but am agnostic 
about whether events can instantiate properties, strictly speaking.  
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The second option would be to embrace Davidson’s view of events, and try to 
modify it to give a place for properties. Such a modification of Davidson’s view may 
not be as dramatic as it may first appear, for two reasons. Firstly, the core of 
Davidson’s account of events is the individuation conditions on events, and as far as 
Davidson is concerned, these individuation conditions are spelled out in terms of an 
event’s causes and effects. Now, we can retain the claim that events are to be 
individuated in terms of their causes and effects, whilst claiming that events can 
have properties. So, the fact that we are welcoming properties into our account of 
events does not mean that we must abandon Davidson’s view of events entirely. 
Secondly, it is important to re-emphasize that modifying Davidson’s account to 
incorporate properties is not a criticism of my proposed position, but a virtue of it. 
Recall from section 2.2 that Davidson’s neglect of properties in his account of events 
is highly implausible for metaphysical reasons. So, we certainly should not baulk at 
this modification of Davidson’s view. 
Whether to adopt a new view of events, or to modify Davidson’s own, is a 
choice that should be dictated by one’s background ontology, and which view of 
events fares best in terms of general metaphysical considerations. For what it is 
worth, my own choice would be to abandon Davidson’s view of events entirely, and 
embrace Kim’s.19 However, it is a dialectical advantage of my version of anomalous 
monism that it does not force us to accept any one view of events in particular. 
																																																								
19 This is partly because of the much discussed problem concerning whether Davidson’s 
account of events is circular (Quine 1985: 166) and partly because of the theoretical power of 




8. Concluding remarks 
As I mentioned above, anomalous monism is currently out of fashion. It is not 
difficult to see why. The view has been subject to a wide variety of powerful 
criticisms, most prominently the objection based around epiphenomenalism. I am 
willing to accept that these are powerful criticisms of certain interpretations of 
anomalous monism.  However, I have argued that there is another version of 
anomalous monism, which is thoroughly property-realist, and deeply informed by 
contemporary work on the metaphysics of dispositions and causation, which can 
avoid all of the objections that have previously been levelled at the view. Given all of 
this, I conclude that the current unpopularity of anomalous monism is unwarranted, 
and the view is due for a reappraisal. Anomalous monism is still a serious and very 
attractive contender in the metaphysics of mind.20 	 	
																																																								
20 Thanks to Laura Gow for helpful conversation. Thanks also to the Leverhulme Trust and 
the Isaac Newton Trust for an Early Career Fellowship (ECF-2015-088) that supported me 
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